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Absfract: This paper investigates the role of temporal uncertainty and information issues in 
economic decisions. It shows that the nature of the economic environment (e.g. the production 
technology) can inlluence the valuation of information. which in turn affects the choice functions. 
This is illustrated by an empirical application to yield response analysis in Burkina Faso. The 
paper stresses the importance of technology and information valuation in risk behavior. 
1. Introduction 
The influence of risk on economic decisions has been the subject of much 
research. The most common approach has involved the modeling of ‘timeless 
risk’ in an expected utility framework. ‘Timeless risk’ is used here to refer to 
the case where either uncertainty is resolved immediately or all decisions are 
made at the same time. In this context, many attempts have been made to 
investigate and measure the timeless risk preferences of decision makers’ 
*This research was conducted in the context of a cooperative agreement between ICRISAT 
and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Partial funding was provided by a grant from the 
World Bank. 
‘Timeless risk preferences are detined by the curvature of the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function of a decision maker facing timeless risk [see Arrow (1965), Pratt (196-t)]. 
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[for examples in agriculture; see Anderson et al. (1977), Young (1979), 
Binswanger (1981)]. 
An alternative approach would be to consider that decisions are typically 
made sequentially in an uncertain environment. In this context, it is of 
interest to investigate the influence of temporal uncertainty on economic 
choices. Temporal uncertainty corresponds to the situation where decisions 
are made over time as new information becomes available resolving at least 
part of current uncertainty facing decision makers. This new information can 
influence economic decisions and the optimal allocation of resources. In 
particular, temporal risk generates ‘induced risk preferences’ over the tem- 
poral distribution of uncertainty [e.g. Spence and Seckhauser (1972), Dreze 
and Modigliani (1972), Kreps and Porteus (1979)]. Induced risk preferences 
depend on when uncertainty resolves. As argued by Dr&ze and Modigliani 
(1972), the risk premium for a delayed risk depends on two terms: (1) the 
value of information; and (2) the risk premium for the same timeless risk. But 
the value of information typically depends on the nature of the feasible set. 
This suggests that induced risk preferences can depend on the technology 
and the institutional environment of the decision maker. By implying that 
temporal risk behavior can be a by-product of the economic environment of 
the decision maker, it may help generate useful hypotheses about some of the 
factors influencing risk behavior. This could in turn help strengthen analysis 
of economic decisions under risk. For example, this could provide new 
insights on the role of uncertainty in agricultural development [e.g. 
Roumasset et al. (1978)]. Since temporal risk (as opposed to timeless risk) 
appears to be the rule rather than the exception, there is a need to refine our 
understanding of the role of temporal uncertainty in economic decision 
making. 
The objective of this paper is to explore some of the implications of 
temporal uncertainty for risk behavior. We consider the case where current 
decisions are made under risk while other decisions are made in the future as 
uncertainty is being resolved. This allows an analysis of how technology and 
the temporal resolution of uncertainty can influence economic behavior 
under risk. It helps provide some insights on the impact of information and 
technology on economic decisions under uncertainty. 
A general two-period model representing a decision-making process under 
temporal uncertainty is developed in section 2. It is argued that, in the 
absence of good a priori information about the nature of the objective 
function, the effect of timeless risk aversion on decisions may be difficult to 
identify under temporal risk. This is because the valuation of information 
and its impact on decisions may lead to behavior similar to the one obtained 
under timeless risk aversion. It suggests a need to better understand the role 
of information in economic analysis. A few examples are given in section 3 as 
illustrations of the usefulness of the approach. An application to yield 
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response under temporal uncertainty is discussed in the context of an 
extended-quadratic production function (section 4). Some empirical evidence 
concerning the role of information valuation associated with rainfall uncer- 
tainty for sorghum production in Burkina Faso is presented in section 5. 
2. A two-period model 
Consider an economic agent facing a two-period planning horizon (t = 1,2) 
and a preference function U[w, x,, xZ, e] where U is a twice continuously 
differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function satisfying U, = 
dU/?w>O, w is initial wealth, xr is the vector of decision variables at time t, 
and e is a random vector representing temporal uncertainty about the state 
of the world. We assume that e is not known at time t = 1 and has a given 
subjective probability distribution, but becomes observable by the agent 
costlessly before the second period decisions are made. In this context, if the 
agent maximizes expected utility, then economic decisions are made accord- 
ing to the following dynamic programming problem: 
V(w)=MaxEMax U[w,x,,x,,e], (1) 
XlSXl XLEXl 
where E is the expectation operator over the random variables e. X, is the 
feasible region for x1, X,(x,) is the feasible region for x2, and V(\v) denotes 
the indirect objective function of the agent. From backward induction, 
consider the second-period problem 
U(w,x,,e)=Max U[w,s,,~~,e], 
X2EX2 
with x:(w,x,,e) being the corresponding optimal choice function (conditional 
on x1) Then, U(w,x,,e) being the ‘induced preference’ function. the first- 
period problem takes the form 
V(w)=Max EU[w,x,,e], 
XIGXI 
with x:(w) being the optimal first-period decisions. Note that x~(w,x,,e) are 
ex post decisions in the sense that they are made after e becomes observable, 
while x:(w) are ex ante decisions since they are made while e is still 
uncertain. If the decisions x2 were made at time c= 1, they would correspond 
to the following problem: 
Max EU[w,x,,x,,e], 
X2EXI 
which has for solution x’,(w,x,) the ex ante choice functions for x1, which is 
conditional on x,. 
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From the literature on decision theory [e.g. LaValIe (1978)], define the 
conditional value of information about e as the certain monetary value 
D(x,, w) which satisfies 
EMax U[w,x1,x2,e]=MaxEU[w+D(x,,w),x,,x,,e], 
X2E‘i.I XZEXZ 
(2) 
or 
D is the amount of money that must be paid to the agent at time t= 1 in 
order to make him indifferent between making the second-period decisions 
x2 knowing e versus deciding about x2 without learning about e. From (2), 
it follows that D(x,, w) is the conditional selling price of information about e: 
it is conditional on the first-period decisions xi; and it is a selling price (or 
reservation price) in the sense that it measures the monetary value of doing 
away with the information, using the informed situation as the reference 
point. It is well known that the value of information is always non-negative,’ 
i.e., that 
D(x,,w)>=O. 
Indeed, obtaining costless information can never make a decision maker 
worse off. Furthermore, if the information is relevant to the decision-making 
process, obtaining it will usually make him better off. In this case, the agent 
would be made worse off by ‘selling’ relevant information and would need to 
be compensated by a lump-sum payment. This lump-sum payment D(x,, w) is 
the smallest amount of money which would make the agent willing to choose 
x2 without learning about e. It represents the valuation of the ability to 
maintain flexible plans and revise decisions as new information becomes 
available. 
The definition of the value of information in (2) is useful in the sense that 
it can be combined with (1) to reformulate the dynamic programming 
problem as the following timeless problem: 
V(w)=MaxEU[w+D(w,x,),x,,x,,e]. 
XlSXl 
XZEXZ 
(3) 
‘This follows from the assumption that U,>O and the fact that E Max,, U( .)z Max,, EU( .) 
[e.g. see LaValIe (197X)]. Note that D(x,,w) is the gross value of information, which is always 
non-negative. However, when information is costly, then the net value of information (D( .) -C) 
can be positive, zero or negative depending on whether information cost C is less than, equal to, 
or greater than the gross value D( .). 
J.-P. Chacas et al., The role of infbrmarion in decision making 265 
Denote by ,‘cr(w) and -Y?(w) the optimal solutions to (3). Clearly, xl(w)= 
x:(w) since (3) is simply a reformulation of (1): it corresponds to the ex ante 
decisions of the first period as before. However, X1(w) is different from 
x:(w,x:(w),e). First, it is now an ex ante decision since the decision ,c2(w) is 
made based on the information available at time f= 1 (i.e. before the agent 
learns about e). Second, -f*(w) is a compensated choice function since it can 
be influenced by the wealth compensation D(Z,,w). In other words, ,Y~(w) is 
the decision that would be made if the agent had to decide xt at time t= 1 
(i.e. before knowing e) while he is compensated for not being able to take 
advantage of the information that becomes available between t= 1 and ~=2.~ 
Note that, with D set equal to zero, (3) would correspond to an open-loop 
solution, all decisions being made ex ante (before e is known). Given 
dU/Zw >O and D 20, this implies the well-known result that open-loop 
models are always inferior to closed-loop models [such as (l)] as they fail to 
capture the value of flexibility associated with the revision of plans [e.g. 
Bertsekas (1976, p. 204)]. This suggests that open-loop models of production 
are not appropriate tools of analysis whenever new information has a 
significant influence on economic decisions. 
At this point, it will be useful to consider the special case where 
U(w,x,,x,,e) = V(w +f(xl,x2,e)), f( .) being the return function (e.g. dis- 
counted profit) and [w +f(x,,x2,e)] representing the present value of 
terminal wealth. Then (3) takes the form 
V(w)=MaxEU[w+D(w,.u,)+f(x,,x,,e)]. 
XI EX, 
X2GX2 
(4) 
Using the Arrow-Pratt definition of the timeless risk premium, 
R(w,x,,x,)=w+Ef(x,,x,,e)+D(w,xI)-CI-’[EU(.)], 
expression (4) can be alternatively written in terms of its certainty equivalent 
as 
Maxw+Ef(.x,,x,,e)+D(w,x,)-R(w,x,,x,). 
XlCXl 
XZeXZ 
(5) 
‘A special case of interest may be associated with the absence of a wealth effect in the 
decisions f,, i.e. Eis/dw=O [e.g. the case of constant absolute risk aversion for a firm 
maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth; see Chavas (1985)]. In this case, the 
compensation D(x,,w) will have no influence on .cs, and .fl would become the decision made if 
the agent had to decide x2 at time I= I, i.e. f2 could be interpreted as the ex ante plans of the 
agent for x2. 
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As argued by Dreze and Modigliani, eq. (5) shows that the risk premium 
for temporal risk is R = D( w, xi) - R(w, .x1, x,), i.e.. the difference between the 
conditional value of information D(w, x,) and the timeless risk premium 
R(w,x,, x2). Note that, in the absence of risk D = R =O, implying (as 
expected) a zero temporal risk premium. 
Also, from eq. (5), it follows that the timeless risk premium R is positive 
under timeless risk aversion [where U(w) is a concave function], while R is 
zero under timeless risk neutrality [where U(w) is a linear function] [see 
Arrow (1965), Pratt (1964)]. 
Expression (5) indicates that current decisions are made by maximizing the 
sum of the three terms in (5). It suggests that it is desirable to have (a) a high 
expected return Ef( .), (b) a low risk premium R( .) if the agent is averse to 
timeless risk (R >O), and (c) a high value of D( .), i.e. a good ability to adapt 
to temporal uncertainty. In the riskless case, R = D =O, and (a) yields the 
familiar case of profit maximization. Characteristic (b) corresponds to the 
introduction of a non-linear utility function U(w) under risk in static models 
[e.g. Arrow (1965), Pratt (1964)]. Mostly in the context of timeless risk, an 
extensive amount of rersearch has focused on the influence of behavior on 
farmer’s decisions [e.g. Anderson et al. (1977), Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), 
Binswanger (1981), Roumasset et al. (1978)]. Finally, characteristic (c) reflects 
the ability of the agent to modify production plans as new information 
becomes available. The issue of the valuation of information has received 
much attention in the literature [for agricultural examples, see Baquet et al. 
(1976), Byerlee and Anderson (1982), Bosch and Eidman (1987)]. However, 
little work has been done on the empirical implications of the conditional 
value of information D(w,x,) for technological choice and farm production 
decisions (as represented by the vector xi). If flexibility of production and 
marketing plans is an important way for decision makers to deal with 
temporal uncertainty, then additional research on this topic may have high 
potential payoffs. 
Note that D and R are clearly different since D tends to increase the value 
of the objective function while R would decrease it under timeless risk 
aversion. Also, under a linear utility function U(w), R=O but, in general, 
020. Thus, under temporal uncertainty D 20 is not due to timeless risk 
preferences since the flexibility to respond to new information remains 
important even under a linear utility function. 
To further illustrate this, consider the following local measure of the risk 
premium in (5) [Pratt (1964)]: 
R =$Y Var [f( .)I, 
where c(= - V,,/U, is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk-aversion coefficient, 
Var( .) denotes the variance and subscript letters denote derivatives (e.g. 
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U,=SU/dw, u,,= ?‘C;/&‘). Similarly, using the defmition of the value of 
information, then a local measure of D for unconstrained problem (2) can be 
shown to be’ 
A comparison of (6) and (7) indicates that, although R and D are different, 
they both depend on x1, on the preference function V( .) and on the 
subjective probability distribution of e. In the absence of precise information 
about the nature of the objective function (l), this suggests that it is difficult 
to isolate the effect of R from the effect of D on current choices x,. In other 
words, it is possible that some type of risk behavior is attributed to timeless 
risk aversion when in fact it is due to the valuation of information (or vice 
versa). In order to solve this identification problem, good a priori infor- 
mation must exist on the nature of the objective function, the technology and 
the characterization of the uncertainty. However, good a priori information 
on preferences may be difficult to find. On this basis, it may be reasonable to 
focus our attention on how other factors (beside timeless risk preferences) 
can influence economic behavior under risk. In the next section, we briefly 
illustrate our argument in the context of a few examples. 
3. Some examples 
If the value of information D(x,, w) could be easily obtained, then 
expression (5) would provide a convenient basis for analyzing current 
economic decisions. Unfortunately, the value of information as defined in (2) 
can be rather complex, as the influence of some parametric change on D is 
not obvious in the general case. For example, although it may seem intuitive, 
it is not necessarily true that increasing uncertainty (as measured from a 
mean preserving spread) always increases the value of information [see 
Gould (1974), Hess (1982)]. This suggests that the discussion of the 
properties of the value of information and its implications can best proceed 
in the context of some specific examples. 
4Expanding CJ(w,.rt) around f,(w,x,, T) gives 
u(w,x;)= U(W,.~2)+Url(W..~Z)‘[lf-~f2]+ 1/2[xf-~,]‘U,,,,(w,I,).[xf-I1]. 
Similarly, expanding U(w+D,.f,;) around D=O yields 
U(~+D,~~(~~+D).~)=U(W,.~~(W);)+[U~+U~~(~~~/~W)]~,~~~~D. 
Using these two expressions, taking expectations, noting that EU_(f,) =0 (assuming an interior 
solution). and using (2) yields expression (7). 
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3. I. An irreversible decision 
Consider the case of a fixed resource initially used in a particular way. At 
time t= 1, the resource can be left in its initial state (x, =0) or transformed 
into some alternative use (xi = 1). A similar choice is possible at time r =2, 
i.e. x2 = (0 or l}. However, choosing x, = 1 is an irreversible decision in the 
sense that x, = 1 implies x 2=0, i.e. a loss of the option of choosing x2. 
Alternatively, choosing x1 =0 implies x2 = (0 or 11, leaving the option of 
choosing x2 opened. Under temporal uncertainty, this problem can be 
formulated as 
MaxEMax{U(w,x,,x,,e):x,={Oor lj, t=l,2;x,+x,51), 
=I x2 
(8) 
which is a special case of (1). Denote by D(w,x,) the conditional value of 
information in (8). Clearly D(w, l)=O: irreversibility implies no value of 
information for the second-period decision when xi = 1. Alternatively, the 
conditional value of information D(w,O) is non-negative. In this case, O(w, 0) 
has also been called the quasi-option value [see Arrow and Fisher (1974), 
Henry ( 1974)].5 
Using formulation (3), the first-period decision in (8) can be alternatively 
expressed as 
Max{EU[w+D(w,x,),x,,xz,e]:x,={O or I}, t=1,2; x,+x,Sl). 
X,.X1 
It follows that the optimal choice is x, = 1 if 
Otherwise, choose xi =O. This decision rule suggests that the conditional 
value of information D(w,O) (the ‘quasi-option’ value) plays an important 
role in the evaluation of optimal decisions under irreversibility. For example, 
because future information can be of value only if x, =O, the prospect of 
more information in the future can be shown to discourage the adoption of 
an irreversible decision (x, = 1) in period 1 [see Epstein (1980)]. 
3.2. The firm under revenue uncertainty 
The analysis of firm behavior under temporal price uncertainty has been 
presented by Epstein (1978) and Hartman (1976). Here, we focus on a 
5Note that Arrow and Fisher (1974) assume that U(w,x,,x,,e) is an additive function of xl 
and x2. The more general formulation presented here shows that the concept of quasi-option 
value is valid for any form of the objective function given irreversibility. 
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timeless risk-neutral case under revenue uncertainty. It can include both 
temporal price and production uncertainty. Consider a competitive firm with 
profit denoted by {p(e). y( xI,x2,e)-r\x, -r;x2> where p(e) is output price, 
y(x,,x,,e) is the production function, the elements of the vector e denote 
output price uncertainty and/or production uncertainty, and (r’,xl +r;x,) is 
the cost of production, rr denoting the (discounted) price of inputs x,, t = 1,2. 
Assuming a linear utility function U(w) (i.e. timeless risk neutrality), the firm 
decides to make production choices that maximize expected profit under 
temporal uncertainty: 
MaxE Max(p(e).y(x,,x,,e)-r\x,}-r;x, (9) 
X,20 X220 
where r;xl constitutes a fixed cost at time t =2. In the context of (9), the 
conditional value of information is 
-MaxE{p(e).y(x,,x,,e)-r;x,}, 
.I* 2 0 
which measures the expected profit loss caused by choosing x2 without 
observing e. 
From (3), the first-period decision x1 can be characterized by 
(10) 
Expression (10) indicates that the conditional value of information will 
influence the choice of the production decisions x1. For example, under 
competition, the lirst-order necessary conditions for an interior solution for 
x1 are 
g + E p(e) ay(xiix2t e, 
- 1 -rl =O. 1 1 (11) 
This shows that, at the optimum, the expected marginal value product with 
respect to x1 [the second term in (1 l)] is greater than, equal to or less than 
the input price rl whenever the marginal value of information i-D/ax, is 
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negative, zero or positive, respectively. In other words, the static optimality 
conditions (stating that expected marginal value product equals input price) 
would no longer hold when the marginal value of information is non-zero. In 
such a case, temporal uncertainty and information would affect the optima- 
lity of production decisions even under timeless risk neutrality. 
In order to illustrate further the influence of temporal uncertainty on 
production decisions, consider the following specification for the production 
function: 
y(xl,x,,e)=a(x,,e)+x;b(x,,e)+ 1/2x~A(x,)x,, (12) 
where A(x,) is a negative definite matrix corresponding to the strict 
concavity of the production function in xZ. The specification (12) is of 
interest because it allows an explicit evaluation of the value of information 
0(x,). In particular, if price uncertainty and production uncertainty are 
independently distributed, then the value of information for a timeless risk- 
neutral firm takes the form 
D(x,)= - 1/2E(p).Tr {A(.~,)-‘.Var[b(x,,e)]j 
- 1/2&4(x,)-‘r, {E(;)-&jZO> (13) 
where Var( .) denotes the variance and Tr( .) is the trace. The first term in 
(13) represents the value of information associated with production uncer- 
tainty, while the second term is the value of information associated with 
output price uncertainty. Note that the first term is necessarily non-negative 
given the negative definiteness of A(x,). Similarly, the second term is 
non-negative since Jensen’s inequality implies that E( l/p) > l/E(p), l/p being 
a convex function of p for p>O. 
It follows from (13) that the marginal value of information dD/dx, in (11) 
can be positive, zero, or negative depending on the nature of the production 
technology, i.e. depending on how A(x,) and the variance of b(x,,e) vary 
with xi. If eq. (12) is specified as a polynomial function, the absence of third 
or higher order terms involving interactions between xi, x2 and e in the 
production function would correspond to a situation where the certainty 
equivalence principle holds [e.g. see Bertsekas (1976, p. 70)] with dD/Z.u, =O. 
This illustrates the fact that second-order approximations of a function are 
J.-P. Chaws et al., The role of informarion i  decision making 271 
not flexible in modeling the impact of temporal uncertainty on economic 
decisions [see Epstein (1978)]. In other words, third-order (or higher order) 
interaction terms between x1, x2 and e are needed in the production function 
(12) if one wants to avoid imposing strong restrictions on the way 
information influences production decisions in a dynamic context. 
The above discussion illustrates that temporal revenue uncertainty can 
either stimulate or dampen production choice depending on the nature of the 
production technology. The results could be used in the modeling of many 
dynamic agricultural production processes. For example, the effectiveness of 
pest management strategies appears to depend heavily on the information 
available at the time of the decision. This suggests that the economics of 
production decisions may benefit from a detailed analysis of the role of 
information in the cost-benefit evaluation of alternative strategies. Some 
empirical evidence of the characterization of agricultural production techno- 
logy and on the influence of information valuation is presented next in the 
context of sorghum yield response. 
4. An application to yield response 
Yield response is a dynamic process reflecting biological growth of the 
plant considered. The production process can be divided into time intervals 
or stages, state variables being used to characterize the dynamics of the 
process at various stages. Although the growth process of crops is a 
continuous one, we can categorize the most critical growth stages of the 
plant which correspond to the management activities taking place at that 
time. 
We characterize the growth process by the following state equation: 
un+l=f.(u,,xn,en,T), n=O,l,... ,N-1, 
where 
u,= the state of the plant at a stage n (e.g., height, biomass), assumed to 
embody the effect of all inputs and random components in earlier stages; 
x,=a vector of ‘controllable’ decision variables affecting plant growth (e.g., 
weeding labor hours, kilograms of fertilizer); 
e, =a vector of ‘uncontrollable’ environmental factors reflecting the uncer- 
tainty resolved at stage n (e.g., rainfall); 
T =a variable representing the characteristics of technology (e.g., soil fertility 
measure); 
N =number of stages involved in the growth process. 
If we take the initial state u,, as given, it follows that 
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Assuming that yield, y, is a function of the state of the plant in its final stage, 
i.e. y = k(uN), we can express the yield function as 
(1% 
which is a multi-stage production function. Expression (15) says that crop 
yield in the tinal stage depends on events of earlier stages and the given level 
of technology. 
As discussed above, a relevant economic implication of the sequential 
nature of the decision-making process concerns the value of information. 
Here, we focus on a three-stage yield model (N =3) where the first stage is 
the planting stage, the second stage corresponds to weeding (or replanting in 
case of crop failure) and the third stage corresponds to harvesting. 
In order to obtain analytical results concerning the value of information, 
the yield function (15) was specified according to the specification (12). 
Expression (12) can be interpreted as an ‘extended’ quadratic specification of 
the technological relationship between input and output. It appears to be a 
reasonable choice for two reasons. First, a quadratic function has often been 
found satisfactory in the analysis of yield response [e.g. Heady and Dillon 
(1961)]. Second, as discussed above, expression (12) includes third-order 
terms that are necessary if we do not want to impose strong restrictions on 
the way information influences production decisions. 
More specifically, the following form for the yield response function was 
used: 
y(x,,x,,e)=a+/?x,+x;Bx,+xi~/+Ce+Gx,e]+1/2x;Ax,, (16) 
where y is yield per hectare, x, are decisions made at stage n, n = 1,2, e 
represents the temporal uncertainty resolved between stage one and stage 
two, and A and B are symmetric matrices of parameters. 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents some empirical evidence concerning the influence of 
information on farm practices in Burkina Faso (West Africa). This is done 
first by estimating the yield response function (16) for sorghum. The 
implications of information valuation for production decisions are then 
interpreted in the context of expressions (lo), (11) and (13) discussed above. 
Data were taken from a survey of farm practices in Burkina Faso 
conducted from 1981 to 1983 by the International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). The data consist of white sorghum 
yield and related input information on 459 farm plots from the Yako region 
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[Kristjanson (1987)]. The Yako region is representative of the Central Mossi 
Plateau where approximately 60 percent of Burkina Faso’s population lives. 
Classified as the North Sundanian zone, it has a long-term average rainfall of 
700-900mm distributed over 4 to 5 months. Soils tend to be very shallow 
with low organic matter content. Sorghum is the dominant crop grown in 
this region. Very little animal traction is used. 
Soil quality differs greatly and is strongly related to the position in the 
toposequence. Information on the type of soil (e.g. sandy, clayey), the 
position of the field in the toposequence (e.g. plateau, lowlands), and its 
proximity to the compound were used to define a proxy variable (soil type) to 
account for the predominant soil quality of each plot. The traditional variety 
of sorghum planted was identified as either short-cycle or long-cycle through 
the farmers’ own identification of the cycle length of particular varieties. 
Other factors influencing yield include the number of labor hours spent on 
first weeding and second weeding, and the kilograms per hectare of added 
chemical fertilizer and/or manure. Table 1 summarizes some of the factors 
influencing sorghum yield. 
Rainfall is considered to be the major risky variable influencing yields in 
the West African semi-arid tropics. Thus, the temporal uncertainty e in eq. 
(16) was taken to be the amount of rainfall during the first thirty days after 
planting. It was included as an explanatory variable in the model and is 
expected to have a strongly positive influence on yield. 
Some critical interactions between explantory variables were identified and 
included in the model specification. The first-stage or xi decisions - what to 
plant, when to plant, whether to fertilize can be affected by the knowledge 
that information about rainfall will be gained before stage two decisions are 
made (i.e. replanting, weeding). In order to investigate such effects, selected 
third-order terms were included in the function (16) as interaction terms 
between the first-stage input decisions, rainfall e, and the second-stage 
decisions.6 The interaction terms, including the replanting decision, are of 
particular interest since the flexibility to replant may be an important 
element in risk management strategies in Burkina Faso. The manner in 
which informational effects may shift the input demand curves for the x1 
variables is discussed in table 2. 
The multi-stage production function (16) was estimated by OLS. With the 
sequential decision model, the second-stage decision is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the first-stage error term.’ This appears appropriate since 
‘Given the number of explanatory variables considered (see table l), including all variables in 
the extended quadratic specification (16) generated a large number of parameters to estimate. In 
an attempt to reduce the number of parameters, the A and B matrices were assumed to be 
diagonal and some of the coefficients were assumed to be zero. This resulted in the model 
specification presented in table 3 below. 
‘If there were reason to believe a correlation did exist, a simultaneous equation method for 
estimating the model would be required. 
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Table 1 
Explanatory variables. 
Description of Expected influence on yields 
variable and trade-offs involved 
Soil type X,, 
Date X,z 
Variety X, , 
Tkgfert X1& 
Tkgman XI5 
Hrswdl X,, 
Hrswd2 X,, 
Pcarrepl XL3 
Rainfall e 
Dummy variable; Yields on clay soils are expected to be 
good soil = I higher than those on sandy soils due to better 
bad soil = 0 water retention. 
Date of planting Delayed planting may be expected to decrease yield 
in days (Mar. I =0) given the short growing season. 
Dummy variable; Long-cycle varieties may be higher yielding on 
length of growing cycle average. 
of variety seeded; 
short-cycle = 1 
long-cycle = 0 
Total kilograms per 
hectare of chemical 
fertilizer applied 
Total kilograms per 
hectare of manure 
applied. 
Hours of labor spent 
on first weeding task 
Hours of labor 
second weeding 
Percentage of the 
area of the plot 
replanted 
Total millimeters 
in first 30 days 
after planting 
Added chemical fertilizer is expected to 
have a positive influence on yield 
(with sufficient rainfall). 
Added manure should have a positive effect 
on yield. 
Increased labor hours should increase 
yields. 
Replanting increases plant density and should 
have a positive effect on yield. 
The amount of rainfall in the first stages of 
growth is expected to have a strongly 
positive effect on yield. 
rainfall (the major risk variable) is included as an explanatory variable 
(rather than modeled as part of the unexplained error term). 
Based on 459 plot level observations, the results of the fitted functions for 
sorghum are presented in table 3. * The F-value is significant at the 1 
percent level (leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero). The R2 is 0.44, with 12 out of 16 variables having 
significant coefftcients at the 10 percent level. 
The soil type variable is strongly significant indicating the responsiveness 
of sorghum to better soil types (i.e., a clay soil, with better water holding 
capacity, gives higher production). The date of planting and the use of short- 
‘Attempts to include fertilizer and manure as quadratic terms (Xf, and X:,) in the model 
gave corresponding coefficients that were positive and not significantly different from zero. This 
suggests that our sample may have too few observations involving high enough fertilizer and 
manure use to allow a precise estimation of the region of the production function where 
marginal products are declining. The results presented below correspond to the model where 
X:, and X:, have been omitted. 
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Table Z 
The influence of selected variables on the value of information D(.r,). 
.Y, decision 
Timing of planting 
(XL,) 
Hypothesized 
influence of 
I, on D 
Negative 
Explanation 
The earlier planting is done, the more flexible a 
position is adopted and the higher is the value 
of information. 
Application of 
chemical fertilizer 
and manure 
(X,4) 
The use of 
short-cycle 
varieties 
(XI,) 
Either 
positive 
or 
negative 
D higher for 
short-cycle 
varieties than 
for long-cycle 
varieties 
Varieties with shorter cycles offer more options 
in terms of timing of planting and the 
opportunity to replant and thus new 
information has a higher value to the farmer 
than with long-cycle varieties. 
cycle traditional varieties have a negative influence on sorghum yield. Both 
the amount of time spent on the first weeding and the second weeding are 
highly significant, indicating the importance of timely weeding of sorghum to 
achieve better yields. Chemical fertilizer is found to have a positive effect on 
yield through its interaction with rainfall and replanting. Finally, manure use 
is significant but only at the 10 percent level. It may be that our soil type 
variable is picking up the influence of manure, since compound land (which 
receives most of the household manure) was included in the characterization 
of ‘good soil’. 
Squared variables that were included have the expected signs. Interaction 
effects (1) between variety, rainfall and percentage area replanted, (2) between 
fertilizer use, rainfall and percentage area replanted, and (3) between date of 
planting, rainfall and first weeding hours, were all highly significant. 
Marginal physical products and elasticities of production are given in table 
4. The productivity of manure on sorghum fields appears to be very low. 
This may be due to the fact that the residual effect of manure is not captured 
in the model. Also, as mentioned earlier, it may be that our soil type variable 
is in fact capturing the benefits of manure on yield. 
The elasticity of production with respect to rainfall is positive with a value 
of 0.41 for long-cycle varieties and 0.73 for short-cycle varieties. The response 
in yield to an increase in the area replanted is positive. This can be expected 
if replanting increased yields due to increased plant density. These results 
appear reasonable, thus suggesting that the extended quadratic specification 
(16) provides a possibly reasonable characterization of the underlying 
technology. 
An hypothesis test of the significance of the included three-way interaction 
terms (the ‘information variables’) was performed, the null hypothesis being 
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Table 3 
Yield function for sorghum (kg’ha).” 
Intercept 
Soil type X, , 
Date X,, 
Variety X, , 
Tkgfert X ,+ 
Tkgman X,, 
Hrswdl XL, 
Hrswd2 Xzz 
Pcarrepl X,, 
Xi* 
Xi2 
XI, 
XI, e 
X,,eX,, 
X,,eXZJ 
X,2eX2, 
25g.57*** 
(48.2) 
I lo.‘*** 
(33.7) 
_ l.j*** 
(0.W 
- 70.3** 
(35.1) 
0.37 
(0.66) 
0.0198 
(0.01) 
0.62*** 
(0.19) 
0.92*** 
(0.19) 
-0.79 
(0.51) 
-000004 
(0.00001) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
- o.OOOoO7 
(O.ooo7) 
(;I;;;* 
3.2*** 
(0.98) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-o.o0001*** 
(O.OOOOO6) 
?I =459; R2 value: 0.4440: F value: 24.17; Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are: *O.lO; 
**0.05; ***0.01. 
G=O, where G is the vector of coefficients of the third-order terms in (16). 
With an F value of 5.7, the null hypothesis that the three-way interaction 
terms are not significantly different than zero is rejected at the 1 percent 
significance level. This illustrates the fact that information considerations can 
influence risk behavior even under a utility function linear in profit. In the 
case, when the timeless risk premium is zero, the temporal risk premium is 
the conditional value of information [see eq. (5)] which affects the first- 
period decisions whenever x1 affects the value of information D. Under a 
linear utility function V(w), from (13), the production function (16) implies 
that the value of information associated with production uncertainty is 
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Table 4 
Marginal physical products and elasticities of production for 
white sorghum. 
Variable .LlPP E. 
Date of plantmg (X,,) 
Fertilizer (X,,) 
Manure (X,,) 
First weeding (X2,) 
Second weeding (X1?) 
Percentage area replanted (XL,) 
Long-cycle varieties 
Short-cycle varieties 
Rainfall (e) 
Long-cycle varieties 
Short-cycle varieties 
-2.17 - 
2.5 
0.018 
0.6 
0.75 
-0.17 
0.05 
0.009 
0.3 
0.3 
72.5 0.05 
562.1 0.36 
1.45 
2.57 
0.41 
0.73 
“MPP= marginal physical product = ?y/?x, E,= production 
elasticity =(?y/Zl) .(x/y). evaluated at mean input levels. 
Under temporal production uncertainty, the significance of the three-way 
interaction terms (see table 3) indicates that information would have a 
significant influence on the following x1 decisions: the date of planting, 
fertilizer use, and the choice of varieties. Here, it is of interest to discuss 
briefly the relationship between D and x1. Given the model specification (16) 
finding dD/2x, <O would imply that flexibility considerations can shift down 
the input demand curve for xL, resulting in a lower optimum level of the 
input x1 (compared to the case where information is not accounted for). The 
opposite would be true if dD/dx, >O. Thus the sign of the marginal valuation 
of information will influence the direction in the shift of the demand curve. 
As an example, the model specification reported in table 3 implies that, 
under timeless risk neutrality, the marginal value of information with respect 
to the date of planting would be negative. This suggests that the optimum 
date of planting as determined by an open-loop model would be later in the 
season than the optimum date obtained from a sequential model. The later a 
farmer plants, the less chance he has to have time to adjust his decisions and 
the lower the value of new information. Thus, our results indicate that, by 
planting earlier, a more flexible position is adopted, which allows a better use 
of rainfall information in production decisions. This flexibility may help 
explain why many farmers in the Sahel tend to plant very early in the rainy 
season. This incentive to plant early should be taken into consideration in 
making recommendations concerning cultural practices in the Sahel. 
Another example is the influence of varietal choice on the value of 
information D(x,). Comparing short-cycle and long-cycle varieties under 
timeless risk neutrality, the model reported in table 3 implies that D is higher 
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for short-cycle than for long-cycle varieties. This result can be interpreted as 
follows. Seed varieties that have a shorter growing cycle can be planted over 
a wider period than long-cycle varieties. They would therefore offer more 
options in terms of timing of planting and the opportunity to replant. This 
would increase the value of information, as suggested by our empirical 
results. In other words, the flexibility of production plans may give an 
incentive to plant short-cycle (rather than long-cycle) varieties even if, ceteris 
paribus, the short-cycle yields are a little lower than the long-cycle yields. 
Given the perceived increase in rainfall uncertainty in the Sahel, this 
incentive may help explain the observed switch made by Burkino Faso’s 
farmers of the past 20 years from long-cycle to short-cycle sorghum varieties. 
These results indicate the potential influence of information valuation on 
risk preferences and economic behavior. It shows that the temporal resolu- 
tion of uncertainty can generate risk behavior (even in the case of timeless 
risk neutrality). However, our empirical results should be interpreted with 
caution. For example, we limited our analysis to a two-period model. 
Extending the investigation to more than two periods appears desirable.’ 
Note that it would imply that our timeless utility function U( .) in section 2 
would, in fact, be an induced preference function from the third, fourth, etc. 
periods. In other words, our timeless risk premium R( .) in (5) would in fact 
be a temporal risk premium that would depend on the valuation of the 
information becoming available in the third, fourth, etc. periods. This 
suggests the need for further research on the role of information valuation in 
risk behavior. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has developed a method to investigate the role of temporal 
uncertainty and information issues in economic decisions. It suggests that the 
nature of the economic environment (e.g. the production technology) can 
imply that the choice functions can be affected by uncertainty (e.g. as 
measured by a variance) even under a linear utility function (i.e. timeless risk 
neutrality). This raises the question of the identification of timeless risk 
aversion in economic behavior. For example, it is possible that some type of 
risk behavior is, in fact, due to the valuation of information. This has been 
illustrated by a few examples and by an empirical application to yield 
response analysis. 
This paper has presented some evidence on the influence of technology 
and temporal uncertainty on risk behavior. It has been emphasized that, in 
‘Another possible extension would be to make the model more realistic by increasing the 
number of decision variables at each time period. This case has been discussed by Machina 
(1984). 
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general, objective functions that provide second-order approximations (com- 
monly found in empirical research) are nor flexible in the investigation of 
information issues. The empirical evidence presented in the context of 
sorghum yield response under temporal rainfall uncertainty indicates that the 
valuation of information can be expected to influence production decisions. 
The interaction terms playing a role in information valuation were found to 
be significant, leading to the conclusion that temporal rainfall uncertainty 
and flexibility issues can play an important role in agricultural production 
decisions in Burkina Faso. 
By stressing the importance of technology and information valuation in 
risk behavior, this paper has proposed a new direction of research on risk 
analysis. This new direction should be of interest to the extent that temporal 
uncertainty appears to be the rule rather than the exception in the real 
world. Also, in the case where the institutional environment of decision 
makers can influence information valuation, this would allow policy instru- 
ments to influence directly risk behavior. For example, noting that uncer- 
tainty seems to play an important role in the process of agricultural 
development [e.g. Roumasset et al. (1978)]. our approach may provide new 
insights in the design and evaluation of development policy. It is hoped that 
this research will stimulate additional empirical work which can help refine 
our understanding of the role of information in economic analysis and 
policy. 
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